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When A Speech Code Is A Speech
Code: The Stanford Policy and the
Theory of Incidental Restraints
Elena Kagan*
The title of Professor Grey's article, How to Write a Speech Code
Without Really Trying, is instructive, if in some tension with what
follows it. The tide suggests two points: first, that Grey did not
intend to write a speech code; second, that Grey wrote a speech
code. I'll trust Grey on the first; he would know better than I.
I'll agree with him on the second - except that I'm agreeing
with his title only; as the rest of his article makes clear, Grey
still denies he wrote a speech code. It is on that essential point,
involving the distinction in First Amendment doctrine between
direct and incidental restraints, that I take issue with his exceptionally interesting and provocative article.
Grey wrote an exceedingly narrow speech code - perhaps
the narrowest that can be imagined. He wrote a speech code, as
he insists, that in some sense recognized the value of a free
speech system. He wrote a speech code that a reasonable system
of First Amendment law could permit.' But Grey did write a

* Professor of Law, University of Chicago; on leave 1995-96 to serve as Associate Counsel to the President. A.B. 1981, Princeton University; M. Phil. 1983, Oxford University; J.D.
1986, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Geoffrey Stone and David Strauss for helpful comments.
' This is not to say that the current system of First Amendment law permits the Stanford Policy. That Policy, as Grey explains, barred a subset of unprotected speech - specifically, fighting words, based on sex, race, or other listed characteristics. As restrictions on
speech go, this one is narrow indeed; too, it is prefaced, for whatever this is worth, with a
statement of commitment to the principles of free inquiry and speech. But unless Grey is
right that the Stanford Policy should be viewed not as a ban on speech, but as part of a
generally applicable regulation against discrimination, the Policy falls within the holding of
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), that a prohibition of race-based fighting
words violates the First Amendment. I have discussed that decision in an earlier article. See
Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: RAV. v. St. Paul, Rust v.
Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1993 S. CT. REv. 29, 60-76. As I
noted there, I agree with Grey and ll the concurring Justices in RA.V. that even under its
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speech code, and from that fact a great deal both does and
should follow.
This Comment on Grey's article addresses the scope of the
First Amendment's doctrine of incidental restraints, which I
think Grey misdescribes. It considers both the rationale and the
need for that doctrine, which I think Grey underacknowledges.
And finally it notes some practical political effects of the doctrine, which I wish Grey, in his capacity as drafter of the Stanford Policy, had more fully recognized. What is perhaps most
disturbing about the Stanford experience is not that the University adopted, yes, a speech code, but that in doing so, it did
little to foster, and perhaps much to undermine, its own (and
Grey's own) goal of equality.
I. APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF INCIDENTAL RESTRAINTS
Grey defends the Stanford Policy primarily on the basis of the
distinction prevalent in First Amendment law between direct and
incidental restraints on expression. 2 The Policy, according to
Grey, did not concern speech as such; it concerned all discriminatory harassment, of which "hate speech," narrowly defined,
formed just a part.' Because the Policy was generally applicable
own analysis, the R.A.V. Court might well have upheld the St. Paul ordinance - and thus
also approved the Stanford Policy - as a ban on the subcategory of fighting words that
most pose the dangers associated with fighting words generally.
Grey's need to defend the constitutionality of the Policy arises from the Leonard
Law, which applies First Amendment requirements to the disciplinary regulations of
California's private universities. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West Supp. 1996). Even before passage of the Leonard Law, however, both Stanford and Grey had committed themselves to abiding by First Amendment standards. Whether a university like Stanford should
commit itself in this manner seems to me a difficult question, which this Comment will not
address.
' See Thomas C. Grey, How to Write A Speech Code Without Really Tiying: Reflections on the
StanfordExperience,29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 891, 928-35 (1996). Grey assumes in his article, as
I do in this reply, that an inarguably general law against discriminatory harassment - a law
that did not mention speech at all - would meet any applicable First Amendment requirements, even when applied to such speech as the Stanford Policy covered. The Supreme
Court has indicated its agreement. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370
(1993). Some commentators, however, have disputed the point. See, e.g., Kingsley R.
Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment4 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991) (stating that broad judicial definition of harassment in Title VII,
including speech, is inconsistent with First Amendment); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992) (arguing that general anti-harassment laws do not satisfy First Amendment requirements).
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in this manner, applying to both speech and conduct, it raised
no serious First Amendment problem. Of course, the Policy
specifically described its application to expression, explaining
that fighting words based on sex, race, color, handicap, religion,
sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin fell within its
broader coverage. But this explicit notation, according to Grey,
should have counted for, rather than against, the Policy because
by making clear precisely what speech the general prohibition
covered, the reference mitigated the potential chilling effect of
the Policy on other expression.4
To evaluate this claim, it is necessary to take a step backward
and ask what underlies the Court's distinction between direct
and incidental restraints on expression.' The distinction makes
no sense if what matters, under First Amendment doctrine, is
the effects of a law on a speaker's expressive opportunities. The
Stanford student who wishes to engage in race-based invective
will "suffer" no more from a direct restriction on hate speech
than from a generally applicable anti-discrimination regulation
that covers all the speech affected by the direct restriction, but
conduct in addition. The distinction likewise makes no sense if
what matters is the effects of a law on an audience's ability to
hear and consider a range of viewpoints. Again, the debate
about race in the Stanford community will "suffer" no more
from the one (speech-directed) form of regulation than from
the other (generally applicable) kind. So much is always true of
the distinction between direct and incidental restraints: the
Court's use of the distinction cannot derive from considering
the effects of such restraints, whether on a speaker or on an
audience.6
See Grey, supra note 3, at 923-24.
For more expansive treatment of this subject, see Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public
Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Analysis, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413,
491-505 (1996); Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental
Restraints on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779 (1985); Geoffrey R. Stone, ContentNeutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 105-14 (1987).
6 To use a far-flung example, compare a (direct) law imposing a penny tax on the
Sunday edition of the New York Times with a (generally applicable) law providing tax benefits for companies entering into certain kinds of mergers. Even if the effect of the direct
law is nil and the effect of the generally applicable law is to restructure the whole communications industry, current doctrine subjects the former to strict scrutiny and the latter to
mere rationality review.
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But now assume that First Amendment law largely concerns
motives, rather than effects - more specifically, that the doctrine has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of
improper governmental motive.' This prohibited motive may
roughly be termed "ideological"; it exists when simple disapproval of an idea - as distinct from a neutral evaluation of the
harm that idea causes - enters into the decision to limit expression.8 The Court, of course, cannot ascertain this illicit motive directly - or at least, cannot do so with any effectiveness.
Hence, the Court (whether consciously or not is unimportant)
has constructed and relied upon a set of rules and categories,
most focusing on the facial aspects of a law, that operates as a
proxy for this direct inquiry. These rules comprise tools to flush
out impermissible motive and invalidate actions infected with it:
they enforce the central command of the First Amendment that
the government cannot interfere in the realm of speech simply
because it finds some ideas correct and others abhorrent.
The doctrine of incidental restraints, as Grey himself recognizes,9 serves precisely this function of assisting in the discovery of
improper motive. A generally applicable law by definition targets
not a particular idea, nor even ideas broadly speaking, but an
object that need not, and usually does not, have any association
with ideas whatsoever. The breadth of these laws makes them
poor vehicles for censorial designs; they are instruments too
blunt for either effecting or reflecting ideological disapproval of
certain messages. (Consider, for example, the likelihood that a
law prohibiting fires in public places - though encompassing
such speech as the burning of an American flag - has resulted
from ideological disapproval of certain messages.) Thus, incidental restrictions receive minimal constitutional scrutiny because of
the likelihood that they will also be accidental restrictions in the
relevant sense - that they will result from a process in which
officials' hostility toward ideas qua ideas played no role.
For a broadscale defense of this proposition, discussing many aspects of First
Amendment law, see Kagan, supra note 5.
a This definition of impermissible motive raises many hard questions, of both a conceptual and a practical nature. For discussion of these issues, which I cannot explore here,
see generally UL at 428-37.
9 See Grey, supra note 3, at 919.
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With this as background, turn to the Appendix of Grey's article and review the text of the Stanford Policy." The Policy is
not a regulation that, in the manner of incidental restraints
generally, refers to a broad class of activity, including but nowhere mentioning expression. The Policy is not even a regulation that breaks down a broad class of activity into all its component parts, listing expression but equivalently listing kinds of
non-expressive conduct as falling within the scope of the general
prohibition. The Policy, although referring to a broad anti-discrimination ideal, is nonetheless - on its face and by its terms
all about expression. It explicitly considers the benefits and
harms of expression; weighs the one against the other; determines the point at which ideals of free inquiry should give way
to opposing values. The Policy, in other words, constitutes the
very opposite of the usual incidental restraint: a specific and
considered judgment of the desirability of restricting certain expression.
As a law takes on this form, the Court's motive-based concerns rise to the fore. Consider, to continue the example previously offered, if a city were to replace its general ban on public
fires with an ordinance explicitly discussing application of the
ban to flag-burning. No one deciding whether to adopt the new,
focused ordinance could do so without evaluating its effect on
speech - more, without evaluating its effect on a particular
message. And in considering this effect, sheer hostility of the
idea

-

that is, impermissible motive

-

well might enter the

decision-making process. So too when Stanford adopted its new
Policy, moving from a generalized "morals code" to an explicit
exposition of how this code applied to certain racist (sexist, etc.)
expression. In general, as a limit on speech becomes less hidden, the danger of illicit motive increases: hence the current
doctrine's distinction between facially direct and facially incidental restrictions." For a court to do what Grey suggests - to
classify an explicit speech-directed action as "incidental" whenevSee id. at Appendix.
Of course, this generalization, like all generalizations, sometimes fails; it even could
be argued that it does not hold up in the Stanford case because the initial incidental ban
obviously and importantly (even if not facially) applied to speech. But the generalization
works well enough to make it a useful test for ascertaining governmental motive, given the
difficulty of finding such motive directly.
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er it can be conceptualized as a component of a broader, nonspeech prohibition - would subvert the very basis of the doctrine. Such a move would prevent the doctrine of incidental
restraints from performing its core function of ferreting out
impermissible governmental motive.
Grey is right that the rule against directly referring to speech,
if followed in this case, would have made the Policy's application
to speech more vague and hence more chilling. But it is not
surprising that First Amendment doctrine declines to take account of this point. First, the enhanced chilling effect that Grey
notes is not usually, let alone invariably, the result of a narrow
(i.e., the current) understanding of the category of incidental
restraints. Such an effect arises here only because the contours
of the general prohibition are unusually uncertain; in the more
common case, a list of applications to speech will serve as much
to confuse as to clarify the issue." Second and more important,
First Amendment doctrine, as I have suggested earlier, always
cares less about effects than about motives. 3 In any clash between the two - in any case in which a concern with untoward
effects points to one doctrinal rule and a concern with improper
motive points to another - the doctrine tracks the concern
with motive. The distinction between direct and incidental restraints, in both its broad outlines and its shadings, provides but
a single instance. 4 Grey's attempt to rework the distinction to divorce it from its underlying motive-based rationale, which in
turn links it with the rest of First Amendment doctrine - thus
was preordained for failure.
II.

CHALLENGING THE DOCTRINE OF INCIDENTAL RESTRAINTS

Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of labeling the Stanford
policy an incidental rather than a direct restraint, Grey turns
" Consider, for example, the law against lighting fires in public places (incidentally
restricting a person who bums a flag as a means of protest), or a law against vandalism
(incidentally restricting a person who draws a swastika on a synagogue wall), or a law
against trespass (incidentally restricting a person who burns a cross on private property). In
cases of this kind - which are very much the norm - listing the law's potential applications to expression cannot serve a constitutionally legitimate purpose.
" See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
,4 See Kagan, supra note 5, at 491-505.
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midway through his article to challenging the coherence of that
distinction, at least when civil rights law is at issue. 5 The basic
point is by now familiar, having become a staple of certain critical race theory. 16 We cannot distinguish, or so the argument
goes, between civil rights statutes (incidental restraints) and hate
speech codes (direct restraints), because both really target expression. In Grey's words, "we prohibit discrimination in significant part because of its 'expressive content,' because of the message of group inferiority it sends."' 7 The proscription, for example, of segregated schools should be viewed at least in part as
a ban on the message of racial inferiority, deemed to cause stigmatic injury. The proscription contained in a hate speech code
is nothing more. Hence, to put the point in its bluntest form,
8
the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education"
conflicts with the district court's decision invalidating the Stanford Policy.
In staking this claim, Grey no doubt is on to something.
Antidiscrimination laws are in part about message. Indeed, we
can abstract Grey's point, because so too are other kinds of laws
apparently directed at conduct. Many incidental restraints interfere, as civil rights laws do, with the communication of a message attending an act, as well as the injury that follows from that
communication. This is because both conduct and speech may
cause identical "expressive" harms, such as stigmatization. The
phenomenon is not limited to the sphere of civil rights, but
exists all over, by virtue of the simple fact that most acts say, as
well as do, something. 9
But it is well not to overstate the equivalence of an act and
the message it carries, whether in the field of civil rights or in
any other. Grey provides, though perhaps does not highlight
See Grey, supra note 3, at 934.
See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 449-57.
'7 Grey, supra note 3, at 934.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"
Conversely, most speech does as well as says something in some sense. For the most
extreme version of this claim and its implications, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DiscOutpsEs ON LIFE AND LAW 129-30, 193-94 (1987). For a more moderate
version, in part critiquing MacKinnon, see Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U.
CHI. L. REv. 795, 836-40 (1993).
'5
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sufficiently, the appropriate caveat: after all, he notes, discrimination (in employment, housing, or other material benefit)
remains discrimination even when well hidden.' Message matters, but it is not all that matters; when the government forbids,
say, segregated schools, it does more than shape the world of
communication. This wider significance is precisely what justifies
the generalization, discussed earlier, that an incidental restriction is less likely than a direct restriction to arise from hostility
toward certain messages: because the government is regulating
on the basis of something other, or at least more, than expressive content, this illicit factor should have less effect on the
decision-making process.
Perhaps more important, I count Grey's claim as a prime
example of a category of academic ideas that I call Ultimately
Useless Insights - ideas that, however true and even important
in some sense, do not and cannot assist in the elaboration of
legal doctrine. Grey himself half-concedes this point by noting
the logical conclusion of his insight: If civil rights laws partly target the "stigmatic messages" associated with conduct and if,
therefore, the same messages, when conveyed by speech, are
likewise subject to limit, "there wouldn't," in Grey's own words,
"be much to freedom of speech on some of the central contested issues in our politics and culture."2 Under the proposed
analysis, the government (or a university operating under the
government's rules) could restrict not only race-based (or sexbased, etc.) fighting words, but all speech that stigmatizes on
the basis of group characteristics. The care that Grey put into
crafting a carefully limited restriction, applying only to fighting
words, would have been wasted. The expressive content of the
conduct that civil rights laws target would render vast amounts
of speech on race (or gender, etc.) proscribable.
The same point applies generally. If the conduct encompassed
by an incidental restriction has some expressive content, as almost all conduct does, Grey's insight would seem to allow direct
0 See Grey, supra note 3, at 934-36.
Id at 937. The alternative conclusion of Grey's insight is that there wouldn't be
much to civil rights laws. This conclusion would hold if the message associated with discriminatory conduct brought laws prohibiting that conduct under the protection of the
First Amendment.
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restriction of any speech with the same message. Alternatively,
though Grey does not consider the possibility, his insight might
require the protection of any conduct expressing a message that is, of conduct generally. Either way, First Amendment analysis becomes impossible: either the First Amendment protects no
speech, or it protects speech and all else in addition. Some
distinction between direct and incidental restraints, regardless
whether the precise motive-related distinction used in current
law, thus seems a necessary component of a free speech system.
Grey may agree with this much; perhaps in questioning the
conceptual foundations of the distinction, he wishes not so
much to overturn it as to render it irrelevant to certain (but
only certain) civil rights-type cases. But if that is the point of his
critical insight, he must show how what he calls the "hearts and
minds" argument can fit within, rather than subvert, a workable,
judicially administrable doctrine of incidental restrictions. Until
then, Brown will not justify the Stanford Policy.
III.

POLITICS,

THE POLICY, AND THE DOCTRINE OF

INCIDENTAL RESTRAINTS

Stanford, of course, had a policy before (and after) the Policy
a policy that the Policy was supposed to enhance. Termed
the Fundamental Standard, it requires "respect for order, morality, personal honor and the rights of others. " n Interpreted on a
case-by-case basis over the years, the Standard is understood to
prohibit, in the words of the President of the University, all
"harassment, whether accompanied by speech or not, including
harassment that is motivated by racial or other bigotry." 3 This
regulation, unlike Grey's Policy, is an incidental restraint. 4
-

Id. at 893 n.6 (quoting Stanford's Fundamental Standard).
Id at 897 n.20 (quoting Stanford President Gerhard Casper).
24 To say that the Standard is an incidental restraint is not to say that the First Amendment is irrelevant. An incidental restraint, when applied to speech, may trigger heightened
scrutiny (usually of an intermediate level), as the seminal case of United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968), shows. Applications of the Standard to expression thus may
have to meet certain First Amendment requirements. But I agree with Grey - and with the
dictum in RA. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) - that this would not be the
case where the speech affected falls within a category of wholly proscribable speech, as do
threats or fighting words. And even when speech is fully protected, as in O'Bnen, the application of an incidental restriction to the speech usually (though not always) will receive
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Like many incidental restraints, the Standard has a potentially
profound effect on expression. The Standard, as interpreted,
already may have prohibited all of the speech specifically barred
by the Policy. No doubt the Standard prohibited more speech
besides. Judged solely by its efficacy in eradicating a certain kind
of harmful speech, the direct restriction held no advantage over
the incidental restraint.
Proponents of the Policy might claim for it a symbolic function. True, the Standard might succeed in punishing bigoted
speech of a harassing nature. What the Standard cannot do precisely because it is an incidental restriction - is to send a
clear message about the University's attitude toward this expression. Grey has argued in support of his Policy on another occasion that it was necessary to convey the University's attitude
toward bigotry and intolerance. 5 Similarly, Richard Delgado has
urged on behalf of his proposed tort action for racial insults,
which Grey approves, that it "communicat[es] to the perpetrator
and to society that such abuse will not be tolerated."26 The
general proscription can accomplish all the garden-variety ends
of regulation; the particular, speech-directed proscription is
needed, or so the argument runs, to communicate as forcefully
as possible the governmental actor's commitment to the goal of
equality.
This understanding of the Policy, which views an orientation
toward speech as critical to the achievement of the regulatory
goal, itself casts doubt on Grey's claim to have drafted an incidental restriction. Indeed, this view of the Policy, by highlighting
the different motives that may lie behind direct and incidental
restrictions, suggests one of the key reasons for distinguishing
between these kinds of regulation. But I want to end this commentary by placing these doctrinal issues to one side and evaluating Grey's handiwork solely in terms of its own primary objective: the advancement of equality in the University and the
broader community. This evaluation suggests some practical
more deferential treatment than a direct restraint on the same expression.
' See Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of Discriminatoy Verbal
Harassment, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 81, 104 (Spring 1991) (writing that "I concede that the
main purposes behind the proposal are in a certain sense educative or symbolic.").
" Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 147 (1982).
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political drawbacks of moving, as Grey and Stanford decided to
do, from the generally applicable to the speech directed.
Grey himself alludes to such concerns, in the conclusion to
his article, when he discusses the way in which adoption of the
Stanford Policy distracted from debate, and potential progress,
on more important issues of race and gender. 7 Grey notes that
a broader argument about affirmative action on the Stanford
campus was diverted into the controversy over fighting words.
And citing Henry Louis Gates's potent arguments, Grey more
generally concedes the ability of disputes on speech to shift
attention from, even excuse inattention to, weightier issues,
extending far beyond the academic setting, of inequality in
housing, employment, and other material goods. 8 But even
while acknowledging these costs, Grey stubbornly hangs on to
the Stanford Policy, just as other academics in other educational
institutions insist on still broader restrictions on expression.
Hence occurs the direction of energy away from the alleviation
of material inequalities and toward the elimination - yes, of
"only words"' - of "insults, epithets, and name calling. " '
The costs of opening this two-front war are higher even than
in the usual case - greater than the inevitable loss of focus and
dispersion of resources. As an initial matter, the second front
here occurs in the one place where the opposition - however
disingenuous and hypocritical in fact - seems to many to hold
the high ground.- It is poor strategy to turn a battle about
discrimination into a battle about speech - to mount the kind
of attack most likely to transform the forces of hatred into the
Grey, supra note 3, at 939-45.
See id. at 928. Gates terms the critical race theorists' focus on hate speech "a see-noevil, hear-no-evil approach toward racial inequality," noting that "even if hate [speech] did
disappear, aggregative patterns of segregation and segmentation in housing and employment would not disappear." Henry L. Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk: Why Civil Liberties Pose No
Threat to Civil Rights, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20, 1993, at 49.
'9 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1987).
See generally Delgado, supra note 26.
"
Even Charles Lawrence, a defender of at least some speech codes, has noted:
"
'

I fear that by framing the debate as we have - as one in which the liberty of
free speech is in conflict with the elimination of racism - we have advanced
the cause of racial oppression and ... placed the bigot on the moral high
ground, fanning the rising flames of racism.
Lawrence, supra note 16, at 436.

HeinOnline -- 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 967 1995-1996

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 29:957

defenders of constitutional liberty. Relatedly, the second front
here causes not merely the division, but the permanent loss of
resources. As speech codes, in Grey's words, "set civil rights
advocates and civil libertarians ...

against each other," they

threaten to rend the coalitions that have served well on other,
more important issues.3 2 Grey's tactic of limiting and hedging
such a code can contain, but not avert, this damage.
I suspect that the temptation to fight on this ground, seemingly irrespective of tactical advantage, derives from frustration,
even desperation, over the slow pace of progress in eradicating
the tangible, socio-economic inequalities existing between blacks
and whites and, to a lesser extent, between men and women.
The magnitude and duration of these inequalities may make
them appear impervious to political (let alone to academic)
efforts. We do not know how to solve these problems; we may
not even know how (or perhaps we are afraid) to talk about
them. So some succumb to the allure of sideshows, such as the
one involving the Stanford Policy. There, the issues seem contained, the solutions discernible, the link between activism and
result still full of potential. Victory is achievable, if ultimately
3
3

empty.

The lesson the Stanford experience suggests to me is one
about resisting such urges. If, as Grey laments, "the effort ended
up with a grotesquely unreal portrayal of Stanford as a campus
under the dominion of the thought police"' - if in doing so,
the effort only undermined serious attempts to advance the goal
of equality - neither Grey nor Stanford should profess much
surprise. Stanford's course of action - its shift from a generally
applicable ban on harassment, including racial or sexual harassment, whether or not accompanied by expression, to a targeted
ban on certain bigoted harassing speech - misjudged the political, as well as the legal, environment. Just as the Policy, in directly rather than incidentally restricting speech, became vulnerable to judicial invalidation, so too did it become a focal point
32 Grey, supra note 3, at 944-45.

See Gates, supra note 28, at 49 (stating that "[tihe advocates of speech restrictions
will grow disenchanted not with their failures, but with their victories, and the movement
will come to seem yet another curious byway in the long history of our racial desperation").
" Grey, supra note 3, at 939-40.
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for all manner of public complaint over Stanford's race and
gender policies. The law and the politics of moving from the
general to the particular thus coincided. From either perspective, Stanford and Professor Grey should have declined to convert an incidental into a direct restraint.
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